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In United States v. Berger, a Ninth Circuit panel declined 
to apply the civil loss causation principles established by the 
United States Supreme Court in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. 
Broudo in connection with sentencing in a criminal securities 
fraud prosecution. The Ninth Circuit declined to follow 
Second and Fifth Circuit decisions endorsing the application 
of Dura Pharmaceuticals to criminal sentencing, creating a 
circuit split. This Article examines this split over how to apply 
the loss causation principles of Dura Pharmaceuticals in 
connection with sentencing in criminal securities fraud 
prosecutions. In addition, this Article discusses the 
implications of each approach for criminal securities fraud 
prosecutions, and more specifically, for sentencing. 
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In 2005, the Supreme Court resolved a circuit split by holding in 
Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo1 that a private plaintiff 
claiming securities fraud must show both that the alleged fraud was 
disclosed to the market and the disclosure caused a loss to 
shareholders, that is, that the share price fell after the defendant’s 
fraud became known. No longer could civil plaintiffs merely allege 
that the price of a security was inflated on the date of the purchase 
because of a defendant’s misrepresentation. Although the Supreme 
Court’s decision applied to loss calculation in civil securities fraud 
cases, the Second and Fifth Circuits have since suggested that the loss 
causation principles described in Dura Pharmaceuticals also apply in 
sentencing for criminal securities fraud cases.2
In United States v. Berger, the Ninth Circuit diverged from the 
Second and Fifth Circuits and held that federal judges need not 
follow the loss causation principles that apply in private securities 
actions when calculating the amount of loss for U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines purposes in criminal securities fraud cases.
  
3
                                                                                                         
1 Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336 (2005). 
 This ruling 
could have a profound effect on criminal securities fraud prosecutions 
in the Ninth Circuit, resulting in sentencing enhancements for 
2  See United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2007); United States v. 
Olis, 429 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2005). 
3  United States v. Berger, 587 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2009). 
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defendants in criminal securities fraud cases where “fraud-on-the-
market” formed the basis of the shareholders’ losses. 
This Article explores the Supreme Court’s decision in Dura 
Pharmaceuticals as it applies to loss causation in civil securities fraud 
cases. This Article then examines the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and 
the importance of loss calculation in sentence determination. Next, 
this Article examines the split among the Second, Fifth, and Ninth 
Circuits in applying the loss causation principles of Dura Pharma-
ceuticals in connection with sentencing in criminal securities fraud 
prosecutions. Finally, this Article addresses the implications of each 
approach on criminal securities fraud prosecutions, and more 
specifically, on sentencing. 
 
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN DURA PHARMACEUTICALS, 
INC. V. BROUDO 
 
In Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Broudo, the Supreme Court 
addressed whether a plaintiff could satisfy the loss causation 
requirement simply by establishing that the price of the security on 
the date of purchase was inflated because of the defendant’s 
misrepresentation.4 The plaintiffs were a class of individuals who 
bought stock in Dura Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (Dura) on the public 
securities market between April 15, 1997, and February 24, 1998.5 
The plaintiffs alleged that during that period, Dura’s managers and 
directors allegedly made false statements regarding the company’s 
profits and prospects for future approval of its products by the Food 
and Drug Administration (FDA).6
On February 24, 1998, Dura announced that its earnings would be 
lower than expected, and the company’s shares lost almost half their 
value in trading the next day.
 
7 Nine months later, Dura announced 
that the FDA would not approve its new product, resulting in another 
drop in its share price.8
                                                                                                         
4  Dura Pharms., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 338 (2005). 
 The plaintiffs argued that they suffered 
damages by paying artificially inflated prices for Dura securities in 
5  Id. at 339. 
6  Id. 
7  Id. (falling from about $39 per share to about $21). 
8  Id. 
3
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reliance on the integrity of the market.9
The Court recognized that an inflated purchase price in itself does 
not necessarily equate to or proximately cause the economic loss.
 
10 
At the time of initial purchase, the stock still reflects an economic 
value of the inflated purchase price. If the purchaser sells the stock at 
that instant, or at any other time before the truth of the 
misrepresentation becomes public, the purchaser will not have 
realized any loss.11 Even if the purchaser sells the stock at a lower 
price subsequent to the public release of the relevant truth, the lower 
price “may reflect, not the earlier misrepresentation, but changed 
economic circumstances, changed investor expectations, new 
industry-specific or firm-specific facts, conditions, or other events, 
which taken separately or together account for some or all of that 
lower price.”12 From this, the Court reasoned that “the most logic 
alone permits . . . is that the higher purchase price will sometimes 
play a role in bringing about a future loss.”13
For these reasons, and relying on the common-law roots of 
securities fraud actions, which have long required that a plaintiff 
show actual damages, the Court held that an investor must show that 
the fraud was publicly revealed and that the public disclosure caused 
the investor’s loss.
 
14 In other words, an investor may not establish 
loss causation by alleging that the security price was inflated because 
of the defendant’s misrepresentation. In effect, the Court rejected the 
notion that stock over-valuation resulting from so-called “fraud-on-




II. APPLICATION OF LOSS CAUSATION PRINCIPLES TO CRIMINAL 
SECURITIES FRAUD SENTENCING 
 
Although the Supreme Court has not applied its Dura 
                                                                                                         
9  Id. at 340. 
10 Id. at 342. 
11 Id. at 342-43. 
12 Id. 
13 Id. at 343. 
14 Id. at 345-47. 
15 Id. at 341-43. 
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Pharmaceuticals loss causation principles to sentencing enhance-
ments in criminal securities fraud cases, two federal circuit courts 
have applied the principles in such a context. In United States v. Olis, 
the Fifth Circuit determined that the civil loss causation principles 
described in Dura Pharmaceuticals should inform criminal securities 
fraud sentencing. The Second Circuit endorsed the application of 
Dura Pharmaceuticals’ principles to criminal sentencing in United 
States v. Rutkoske. However, before discussing Olis and Rutkoske, it 
is necessary to examine the importance of loss calculation in a 
criminal setting under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. 
 
A.  Loss Under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines 
 
Using a detailed set of rules, tables, and adjustments that look at 
the entire conduct of a convicted defendant, the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines produce a numerical score, or “offense level,” which then 
translates into a range of months of imprisonment. Since the Supreme 
Court’s decision in United States v. Booker,16 federal district judges 
are no longer required to impose a sentence within the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines. They nonetheless remain obligated to 
calculate and consider the applicable sentencing range under the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines.17
A defendant’s sentence in a securities case can depend heavily on 
the calculation of loss under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. Section 
2B1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines governs the sentencing 
calculation for fraud-based crimes, including criminal securities 
fraud.
 Therefore, the calculation of “loss” under 
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines remains a critical issue at sentencing 
in criminal securities fraud cases. 
18
                                                                                                         
16 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
 This section provides a base offense level for fraud-based 
17 Id. at 246 (“make the Guidelines system advisory while maintaining a strong 
connection between the sentence imposed and the offender’s real conduct”). 
18 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 (2010). It should be noted 
that Section 2F1.1 of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines used to govern the sentencing 
calculation for fraud-based crimes but was consolidated into Section 2B1.1 along 
with the guidelines for theft and property destruction, effective November 1, 2001. 
See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL app. C, amend. 617 (2010). Section 
2F1.1 was applied at the trial court in both United States v. Berger and United 
States v. Rutkoske. See United States v. Berger, 587 F.3d 1038, 1044-45 (2d Cir. 
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crimes, which may be increased depending on various factors, 
including the amount of loss attributed to the offense. The U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines explain that “loss serves as a measure of the 
seriousness of the offense and the defendant’s relative culpability and 
is a principal factor in determining the offense level under this 
guideline.”19 As the amount of loss increases, the offense level 
calculation increases, and thus the sentence increases.20 These 
increases range from zero for losses of $5,000 or less, to as many as 
30 for losses exceeding $400 million.21 For a defendant charged with 
criminal securities fraud, the difference between a loss of $0 and a 
loss exceeding $400 million can mean the difference between 
probation and more than 19 years in prison.22
Guidance for determining the meaning of “loss” within the U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines is found in Application Note 3 of Section 
2B1.1.
  
23 Courts are expected to apply the greater of actual loss or 
intended loss.24 In determining the actual or intended loss attributable 
to a defendant’s conduct, the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines require only 
that courts make a reasonable estimate of the loss, given the available 
information.25 Due to the deference given to sentencing judges, 
courts have used a variety of methods to calculate losses under the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines.26
                                                                                                         
2009); United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170, 174 (2d Cir. 2007).  
 
19 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. background. 
20 Id. at § 2B1.1(b)(1). 
21 Id. 
22 Assuming no other enhancements, a first-time offender involved in a 
fraudulent scheme resulting in a loss of $5,000 or less faces a sentencing range of 
zero to six months. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(a) (2010); 
U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1)(A) (2010); U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (2010). If the loss exceeds $400 
million, that same defendant would be subject to a 30-level increase to the base 
offense level, resulting in a sentencing range of 188-235 months. See U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1)(P) (2010); U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 5, pt. A (2010). 
23 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3 (2010). 
24 Id. 
25 Id. at § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(C). 
26 See United States v. Holliman, 291 F.3d 498 (8th Cir. 2002) (relying on 
losses arising from the defendant’s relevant conduct); United States v. Piggie, 303 
F.3d 923 (8th Cir. 2002) (relying on intended loss); United States v. Manas, 272 
 
6
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The deference given to sentencing judges has resulted in 
uncertainties in how loss is calculated. Combined with the great 
significance given the loss figure by the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, 
this deference has become a primary source of concern for defendants 
and their counsel in criminal securities fraud cases. The following 
federal circuit court decisions address this concern in applying Dura 
Pharmaceuticals loss causation principles to sentencing enhance-
ments in criminal securities fraud cases. 
 
B.  The Fifth Circuit’s Decision in United States v. Olis 
 
The Fifth Circuit became the first appellate court to extend the 
Dura Pharmaceuticals decision to criminal securities fraud cases in 
United States v. Olis.27 James Olis was sentenced to 292 months in 
prison for securities fraud, mail and wire fraud, and conspiracy 
arising from his work as Senior Director of Tax Planning and 
International (and later, Vice President of Finance) at Dynegy 
Corporation (Dynegy) on a transaction called “Project Alpha.”28 The 
offense level was “extraordinarily high” as a result of the district 
court’s finding that the fraud-related losses were in excess of $100 
million.29
In examining Olis’s sentence, the court noted that Dura 
Pharmaceuticals’ principles provided useful guidance for determ-
ining criminal responsibility.
 
30 The court looked to these principles 
for guidance because they “furnish[] the standard of compensable 
injury for securities fraud victims and because [they are] attuned to 
stock market complexities.”31
                                                                                                         
F.3d 159 (2d Cir. 2001) (relying on gain to the defendant); United States v. Hedges, 
175 F.3d 1312 (11th Cir. 1999) (relying on actual loss). 
 The Fifth Circuit vacated Olis’ 
sentence, finding that the district court did not take into account “the 
impact of extrinsic factors on Dynegy’s stock price decline” in its 
27 United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540 (5th Cir. 2005). 
28 Id. at 541. 
29 Id. at 542, 545 (“The most significant determinant of Olis’ sentence is the 
guidelines loss calculation. By the district court’s reasoning, this added twenty-six 
levels to his base offense level and alone placed Olis in a punishment range 
exceeding fifteen years’ imprisonment.”). 
30 Id. at 546. 
31 Id. 
7
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approach to the loss calculation.32 Accordingly, the Fifth Circuit 
remanded to the district court to reconsider the U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines, including a recalc-ulation of the loss caused by Olis’s 
conduct.33 On remand, the district court sentenced Olis to 72 months 
in prison; 220 months less than his original sentence.34
 
 
C.  The Second Circuit’s Decision in United States v. Rutkoske 
 
In 2007, the Second Circuit reached a similar conclusion in 
United States v. Rutkoske.35 David Rutkoske was convicted of 
securities fraud and conspiracy to commit securities fraud. He was 
sentenced to 108 months in prison based on a U.S. Sentencing 
Guidelines range determined from a total offense level of 31.36 The 
offense level included a 15-level enhancement for loss of more than 
$10 million.37 Rutkoske objected to the loss calculated by the 
presentence report, which had been based on the trial testimony of a 
National Association of Securities Dealers expert.38
Like the Fifth Circuit, the Second Circuit noted that Dura 
Pharmaceuticals’ principles provided useful guidance for determ-
ining criminal responsibility.
 
39 The Second Circuit saw “no reason 
why considerations relevant to loss causation in a civil fraud case 
should not apply, at least as strongly, to a sentencing regime in which 
the amount of loss caused by a fraud is a critical determinant of the 
length of a defendant’s sentence.”40 The court acknowledged that the 
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines allowed for a “reasonable estimate” of 
loss and that such allowance remained pertinent.41
                                                                                                         
32 Id. at 548-49. 
 However, the 
district court failed to at least approximate the amount of loss caused 
33 Id. at 549. 
34 United States v. Olis, Criminal No. H-03-217-01, 2006 WL 2716048, at *13 
(S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2006). 
35 United States v. Rutkoske, 506 F.3d 170 (2d Cir. 2007). 
36 Id. at 174. 
37 Id. (The 15-level enhancement had the effect of adding 87 months onto 
Rutkoske’s sentence). 
38 Id. 
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by the fraud absent other factors relevant to a decline in the 
company’s share price.42 Accordingly, the Second Circuit remanded 
to the district court to recalculate the amount of loss, for both 
sentencing and restitution purposes.43
 
 
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECLINES TO APPLY LOSS CAUSATION 
PRINCIPLES IN CONNECTION WITH CRIMINAL SECURITIES FRAUD 
SENTENCING 
 
In United States v. Berger, the Ninth Circuit explicitly declined to 
follow the Fifth and Second Circuits’ extension of Dura 
Pharmaceuticals’ principles to criminal sentencing.44 Richard Berger, 
President, Chief Executive Officer, and Chairman of the Board of 
Craig Consumer Electronics, Inc. (Craig),45 was convicted of 12 
counts of bank and securities fraud for misrepresenting his 
company’s fiscal viability and financial condition in connection with 
his company’s IPO.46 Craig was required to restate its past earnings 
in the year following Berger’s misrepresentation as a result of an 
audit of the company’s accounting records.47 In the months following 
the restatement, the company’s stock price fell from $4.99 to $0.99 
per share.48
The district court initially sentenced Berger to only six months 
imprisonment due to its belief that “controlling authority prohibited it 
from applying any sentencing facts not found by the jury.”
 
49 On 
appeal, the Ninth Circuit vacated Berger’s sentence and remanded to 
the district court for resentencing in light of United States v. 
Booker.50 On remand, the district judge sentenced Berger to 97 
months in prison.51
                                                                                                         
42 Id. at 180. 
 This sentence was on the low end of a U.S. 
Sentencing Guidelines range of 97 to 121 months which was based 
43 Id. 
44 United States v. Berger, 587 F.3d 1038, 1042-43 (9th Cir. 2009). 
45 Id. at 1040. 
46 Id. at 1041. 
47 Id. at 1040. 
48 Id. 
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on an offense level that included a 14-level sentencing enhancement 
for a calculated loss of $5.2 million.52 On his second appeal, Berger 
argued that the district court erred by not employing the Dura 
Pharmaceuticals approach in calculating loss.53
While recognizing that two other circuit courts had applied Dura 
Pharmaceuticals’ principles to the calculation of loss in criminal 
sentencing, the Ninth Circuit held that the primary rationale behind 
the Dura Pharmaceuticals decision did not apply in criminal cases.
 
54 
The Ninth Circuit reasoned that the Supreme Court in Dura 
Pharmaceuticals was “concerned principally with the plaintiff’s 
ability to show that he suffered actual loss caused directly—and 
exclusively—by the defendant’s fraudulent misrepresentation.”55 
This is in contrast to criminal cases, where the court is concerned 
with the loss to society as a whole as opposed to a particular person’s 
loss.56 Therefore, even if an individual’s loss cannot be directly 
linked to the fraud, there could still be general loss to society based 
on the defendant’s fraud.57
In addition, the court found that the application of Dura 
Pharmaceuticals ran contrary to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines. 
Specifically, application of Dura Pharmaceuticals’ loss causation 
principles to criminal sentencing enhancements would conflict with 
“Congress’s clear endorsement” of the overvaluation loss 
measurement method.
 
58 By rejecting the application of Dura 
Pharmaceuticals in criminal sentencing, the Ninth Circuit relied on 
its prior decision in United States v. Hicks59 to find that “a 
defendant’s sentence [must be based on the] harm that resulted from 
the acts or omissions of the defendant.”60
 
 
                                                                                                         
52 Id. 
53 Id. at 1042. 
54 Id. at 1043. 
55 Id. at 1044. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 1045. 
59 United States v. Hicks, 217 F.3d 1038 (9th Cir. 2000). 
60 Berger, 587 F.3d at 1044 (quoting Hicks, 217 F.3d at 1048). 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION IN UNITED 
STATES V. BERGER 
 
The amount of loss caused by securities fraud can be a key 
amplifying factor at sentencing; it has the potential to increase the 
offense level by as many as 30 levels.61 For example, in Olis, the 
defendant’s base offense level was increased by 26 levels due to a 
loss calculation of $105 million.62 The large impact of that loss 
calculation lessens the impact of more relevant issues, such as the 
actual motive of the perpetrator, extenuating circumstances, and the 
personal benefit received by the defendant.63
Also, greater uncertainty exists under the Ninth Circuit’s decision 
in Berger because the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines provide little 
guidance to courts with respect to how loss should be calculated. 
Courts are expected to apply the greater of actual loss or intended loss 
in its determination of loss.
 Instead, these important 
issues have been completely replaced by complex loss calculations. 
64 In addition, courts need only make a 
reasonable estimate of loss.65
In addition, the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Berger will likely have 
an effect on pretrial negotiations among prosecutors and criminal 
securities fraud defendants. These defendants will face the tough 
choice between entering into a plea agreement with a predefined 
sentence or risk receiving a potentially greater sentence based on the 
sentencing court’s calculation of loss under Berger. However, within 
the Second and Fifth Circuits, defendants will likely have a greater 
incentive to go to trial rather than negotiate a plea, because they will 
be less at risk of incurring a large sentence increase due to the 
sentencing court’s loss calculation. 
 Since numerous theories have 
developed to calculate loss, a reasonable estimate of loss may differ 
depending on the sentencing court. Furthermore, these different 
methods will likely be upheld in the Ninth Circuit, allowing for a 
broad range of criminal sentences arising from similar conduct. 
                                                                                                         
61 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1(b)(1)(P) (2010). 
62 United States v. Olis, 429 F.3d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 2005). 
63 Kevin P. McCormick, Comment, Untangling the Capricious Effects of 
Market Loss in Securities Fraud Sentencing, 82 TUL. L. REV. 1145, 1149 (2008). 
64 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(A) (2010). 
65 Id. at § 2B1.1 cmt. n.3(C) (2010). 
11
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The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Berger has set up a circuit conflict 
among the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits. This may lead to 
uncertainty as to the calculation of loss in criminal securities fraud 
sentencing throughout the country. Defendants in the Ninth Circuit 
and perhaps other circuits may now be at the mercy of prosecutors to 
reach a plea agreement before trial to avoid the nearly exponential 
sentence increase that may come with the calculation of market loss 
at sentencing. For those choosing to go to trial, their lawyers must 
attempt to persuade sentencing courts to adopt conservative 
approaches to U.S. Sentencing Guidelines calculations to avoid any 
significant increase to the defendant’s offense level. Given the split 
on this issue, it may be necessary for the Supreme Court to clarify 
whether civil loss causation principles should be applied in criminal 
securities fraud cases. Until this issue is resolved by the Supreme 
Court, criminal securities fraud defendants will have a tough choice 
to make: whether to settle with prosecutors before trial or risk a large 
sentence increase due to market loss calculations. 
12
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